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Orthodoxy in surgery is like orthodoxy in other de-
partments of the mind. It starts as a tentative belief in
some particular course of action but later begins [to al-
most challenge a] comparison with religion. It comes to
be held as a passionate belief [in] the absolute rightness
of that particular view.
-Sir Geoffrey L. Keynes, 19571
INTRODUCTION
Each year in the United States, surgeons perform approximately 64
million surgical procedures, ranging from tooth extraction to open heart
surgery.2 Yet, notwithstanding the frequency of surgical procedures and
their often critical importance to patient health, no state or federal agency
either approves the use of new surgical procedures or directly regulates
existing procedures.3
The absence of surgical procedure regulation differs from the regu-
lation of new pharmaceutical products, which can be introduced into in-
terstate commerce only after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has reviewed "adequate and well-controlled [clinical] investigations" and
concluded the data from those studies sufficiently establish the drug's
safety and efficacy.4 Surgical procedures, by contrast, are more often
conveyed from professor to student, the result being that surgical ap-
proaches may vary considerably from one geographic region to another.5
Whether different techniques produce different outcomes is not always
clear, in part because the absence of regulation means that evidence often
has not been systematically generated or may be in a form not suitable
for comparison.
Commentators have noted the differing treatment that persists be-
tween surgery and pharmaceuticals 6 and have offered a number of justifi-
cations. For example, they have suggested that the surgical profession
should self-regulate,7 that excessive regulation could deter surgeries of
unproven benefit even when the surgery may be in the best interest of the
I Geoffrey Langdon Keynes, Carcinoma of the Breast, 36 N.S. MED. BULL. 161, 161
(1957).
2 See Thomas G. Weiser et al., An Estimation of the Global Volume of Surgery: A
Modelling Strategy Based on Available Data, 372 LANCET 139, 142 (2008) (Table 2).
3 See Robert S. Rhodes, Should Surgery Have an FDA?, AMA J. ETHICS (Oct. 2004),
journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2004/10/pfor2-0410.html.
4 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2017).
5 Jonathan L. Meakins, Innovation in Surgery: The Rules of Evidence, 183 AM. J. SUR-
GERY 399, 399 (2002).
6 David H. Spodick, Numerators Without Denominators: There Is No FDA for the Sur-
geon, 232 JAMA 35, 36 (1975).
7 James W. Jones et al., Professional Self-Regulation: Eyewitness to Incompetent Sur-
gery, 36(5) J. VASCULAR SURGERY 1092, 1092 (2002).
SURGICAL PROCEDURE REGULATION
patient," and that surgical trials could disrupt the doctor-patient relation-
ship, such as by emphasizing uncertainty in a context where patient trust
is important.9 In the context of innovative (as opposed to established)
surgical procedures, controlled trials might be disfavored due to concern
that desperate patients might unwisely submit themselves to risky experi-
mental treatments undertaken by overzealous researchers.' 0 When com-
mentators advocate for increased surgical regulation, they generally limit
their calls for reform to innovative surgical procedures.II The absence of
direct regulation, however, has implications for the quality of evidence
available to support an optimal choice from among all of the alternatives
in the surgeon's armamentarium, whether innovative or standard, and
whether surgical or non-surgical.
This Article first examines the current framework of indirect regula-
tion surrounding surgical procedures and then offers potential explana-
tions as to why surgical procedures themselves are not already subject to
direct federal regulation. Finally, it considers possible contributions of
increased surgical regulation, including the identification of evidence
gaps, the generation or collection of evidence to fill those gaps, and the
impact on surgeon decision-making and patient consent.
I. EXISTING INDIRECT REGULATION OF SURGICAL PROCEDURES
Although no government or private body directly regulates surgical
procedures, various laws and regulations address the healthcare workers
who perform surgery, the medicines and devices used during surgery,
and the facilities in which surgery is performed.
8 Curtis E. Margo, When Is Surgery Research? Towards an Operational Definition of
Human Research, 27 J. MED. ETHics 40, 42 (2001).
9 Kathryn M. Taylor et al., Physicians' Reasons for Not Entering Eligible Patients in a
Randomized Clinical Trial of Surgery for Breast Cancer, 310 LANCET 1363, 1363 (1984); see
also Jeremy Fairbank, Randomised Controlled Trials in Surgery, 354 LANCET 257, 257 (1999);
Mike Gross, Innovations in Surgery: A Proposal for Phased Clinical Trials, 75-B J. BONE &
JOINT SURGERY 351, 352 (1993).
10 Francis D. Moore, Ethical Problems Special to Surgery: Surgical Teaching, Surgical
Innovation, and the Surgeon in Managed Care, 135 SURGERY 14, 15 (2000).
11 See generally Jeffrey S. Barkun et al., Evaluation and Stages of Surgical Innovations,
374 LANCET 1089 (2009); Walter L. Biffl et al., Responsible Development and Application of
Surgical Innovations: A Position Statement of the Society of University Surgeons, 206 J. AM.
C. SURGERY 1204 (2008); Haavi Morreim et al., Surgical Innovation: Too Risky to Remain
Unregulated?, 82 ANN. THORAcIC SURGERY 1957 (2006); Amer S. Ahmed, The Last Twist of
the Knife: Encouraging the Regulation of Innovative Surgical Procedures, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1529 (2005); John D. Casler, Clinical Use ofNew Technologies Without Scientific Stud-
ies, 129 OTOLARYNGOLOGY 674 (2003); Vicki Brower, The Ethics of Innovation: Should Inno-
vative Surgery Be Exempt from Clinical Trials and Regulation? 4 EMBO REP. 338 (2003);
Meakins, supra note 5; David C. Cronin et al., Transplantation of Liver Grafts from Living
Donors into Adults-Too Much Too Soon, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1633 (2001); Statement on
Issues to be Considered Before New Surgical Technology Is Applied to the Care of Patients,
80 BULL. AM. C. SURGERY 46 (1995).
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A. State Regulation of Surgeons and Facilities
State medical boards regulate the practice of medicinel 2 and can
discipline surgeons who fail to meet professional standards.' 3 State agen-
cies may also promulgate regulations to address particular higher-risk
procedures. For example, a regulation of the Washington State Depart-
ment of Health broadly requires that, for certain surgeries requiring seda-
tion or analgesia, physicians "be competent and qualified . .. to perform
the operative procedure and to oversee the administration of intravenous
sedation and analgesia."' 4 In addition to agency-level regulation, state
lawmakers may regulate certain aspects of surgery via legislation. For
example, a New York statute requires those licensed to perform office-
based (i.e., non-hospital) surgery to "report adverse events to the depart-
ment's patient safety center within three business days."' 5 These and
other surgery-related laws (such as abortion laws) are enacted under the
general "police power" of the state to promote public health or morals.' 6
States may also regulate the facilities in which surgery is performed,
such as via accreditation or licensing requirements.' 7 Colorado, for ex-
ample, confers licenses on ambulatory surgical centers only after they
have furnished a certificate of compliance with fire prevention and con-
trol rules.' 8 A Virginia statute provides that podiatrists may perform sur-
gery using a general anesthetic only in an accredited hospital or
ambulatory surgery center.19
Federal law is also a source of indirect regulation of surgical facili-
ties. For example, hospitals must be either accredited or otherwise meet
the conditions provided by federal law in order to receive Medicare pay-
ments.20 The Joint Commission accredits a majority (77%) of United
States hospitals. 21
12 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2902 (2016).
13 See, e.g., id. § 54.1-2408.1; see also id. § 54.1-2400.
14 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-919-601(6) (2016).
15 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 230-d(4)(a) (McKinney 2016).
16 See generally Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power:
The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1975).
17 Jayne O'Donnell, States Lax in Regulating Cosmetic Surgery, USA TODAY (Dec. 27,
2011, 7:19 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/story/2011-12-27/state-
regulations-cosmetic-plastic-surgery-offices/52247588/1.
18 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-102(3)(a) (2013).
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2939 (2016).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (2016); see also Lisa Sprague, Hospital Oversight in Medicare:
Accreditation and Deeming Authority, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F. (May 6, 2005), http://
www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB802_Accreditation_05-06-05.pdf.
21 Facts About Hospital Accreditation, JOINT COMMISSION (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.
jointcommission.org/facts-about-hospital-accreditation.
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B. Federal Regulation of Drugs and Devices
Federal law directly regulates the medicines and devices used by
surgeons. The FDA, through its Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, regulates drugs that may be administered during surgery, such as
general or local anesthetics, anti-emetics, and antibiotics. 22 Similarly, the
FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research regulates biological
products used during surgery, such as blood or blood products that may
be administered to compensate for blood loss. 2 3 In addition, the FDA's
Center for Devices and Radiological Health regulates medical devices
that are used or placed within the body during surgery, such as oste-
otomes, pacemakers, or stitches. 2 4
C. Private Regulation and Gatekeeping
Nongovernmental organizations may also exert a regulating influ-
ence over surgical practice through examinations and the conferral of
certifications. The American Board of Surgery is an independent, non-
profit organization 2 5 that offers board certification in seven specialty ar-
eas, including general surgery, vascular surgery, and hand surgery. 2 6
Other boards that offer certification include the American Board of
Orthopaedic Surgery, the American Board of Plastic Surgery, 2 7 the
American Board of Foot and Ankle Surgery, 28 and the American Board
of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. 2 9 Although these boards are not gov-
ernmental bodies, states may restrict the ability of surgeons to perform
certain procedures unless they possess the appropriate certification. 3 0 At
the local level, healthcare institutions play a more direct gatekeeping role
through licensure, education, training, and experience requirements
22 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2017); About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder (last
visited Aug. 4, 2017).
23 Blood & Blood Products, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Blood-
BloodProducts/default.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
24 See Devices@FDA, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cdrh/devicesatFDAl
(last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
25 About Us, AM. BOARD SURGERY, http://www.absurgery.org/default.jsp?abouthome
(last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
26 Becoming Certified, AM. BOARD SURGERY, http://www.absurgery.org/default.
jsp?examoffered (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
27 Related Links, AM. BOARD SURGERY, http://www.absurgery.org/default.jsp?aboutlinks
(last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
28 History of the American Board of Podiatric Surgery, AM. BOARD PODIATRIC SUR-
GERY, https://crmservices.abps.org/pdf/ABPS/DetailedHistory.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2017);
Foot Surgery: Learn More on How to Qualify, AM. BOARD FOOT & ANKLE SURGERY, https://
www.abfas.org/becomecertified/footsurgery (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
29 AM. BOARD ORAL & MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY, https://www.aboms.org (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017).
30 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-5a-103(3) (2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7009(2)(c)
(McKinney 2016).
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("credentialing"), and by authorizing a particular scope and content of
services in which a given healthcare practitioner may engage
("privileging").3 1
In addition to surgical boards and local control by a surgeon's
healthcare institution, a number of broad-based private sector initiatives
have emerged to promote improvements in healthcare quality, including
surgical quality.32 The Joint Commission, founded in 1951,33 accredits
nearly 21,000 health care organizations and reports clinical quality mea-
sures, such as whether antibiotics are administered within one hour
before the first surgical cut. 34 Another organization, The Leapfrog
Group, was founded in 2000 to represent the interests of large employers
and others who seek to ensure their substantial healthcare expenditures
are well-spent.35 One of its principal initiatives, for example, is to assign
letter grades to hospitals based on their patient safety records.36 The
Council on Surgical and Perioperative Safety, incorporated in 2007, has a
stated mission of "promot[ing] excellence in patient safety in the surgical
and perioperative environment."3 7 While these organizations generally
seek to promote overall healthcare quality through the implementation of
various initiatives, their principal functions do not include the develop-
ment and analysis of evidence with respect to the safety and efficacy of
particular surgical procedures.
II. THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT REGULATION
Despite regulation of the drugs administered and implements used
during surgery, the facilities in which surgery is performed, and the
healthcare workers to whom patients entrust themselves for treatment,
surgical procedures themselves remain almost wholly unregulated. There
31 See Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where's of Credentialing
and Privileging, JOINT COMMISSION (June 21, 2016), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/
1/18/AHCwhowhatcredentialing-booklet.pdf; Revisions to Requirements for Ambulatory
Care Organizations, 33 JOINT COMMISSION PERSPS. 5 (2013) (Standard HR.02.01.03); Privi-
leges v. Scopes of Practice: How to Handle AHPs, 11 OPUS COMMISSION 1, 2 (2002) (discuss-
ing Joint Commission Standard MS.5.14).
32 See Rachael A. Callcut & Tara M. Breslin, Shaping the Future of Surgerv: The Role of
Private Regulation in Determining Quality Standards, 243 ANNALS SURGERY 304 (2006).
33 Facts About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION (July 8, 2016), https://
www.jointcommission.org/facts-about-the-jointcommission.
34 America's Hospitals: Improving Quality and Safety - The Joint Commission's An-
nual Report 2015, JOINT COMMISSION (2015), at 8, https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/
18/TJCAnnualReport_2015_EMBARGOED_1 19_15.pdf.
35 About Us, LEAPFROG GROUP, www.leapfroggroup.org/about (last visited June 17,
2016).
36 Id.
37 Our Team, One Goal, Surgical Patient Safety, COUNCIL ON SURGICAL & PERIOPERA-
TIVE SAFETY, http://www.cspsteam.org/missionvisionvalues/missionvisionvalues.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2017).
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is no industry with members that submit application packages containing
data to support the use of a given procedure. No federal agency reviews
and approves procedures based upon a showing that they are safe, or
even that they are effective, i.e., that they improve the patient's condi-
tion. There is no centralized database of surgical procedures that speci-
fies indications and contraindications, sets forth standardized steps and
techniques, discloses procedure-specific risks and black-box warnings, or
provides available clinical trial data. No federal body systematically and
continuously evaluates safety or efficacy risks of surgical procedures as
evidence develops through clinical practice. As a result, patients and sur-
geons alike must make decisions without the benefit of patient package
inserts or other readily available sources that succinctly present impor-
tant safety and efficacy information.
A. Why Is There No Direct Regulation of Surgical Procedures?
A number of factors help to explain why surgical procedures have
so far generally remained outside the scope of direct government regula-
tion. These factors relate to (1) the perceived sufficiency of existing reg-
ulation, (2) patient and procedure heterogeneity, (3) special challenges in
conducting surgical randomized controlled trials (RCTs), (4) the struc-
ture of the surgical marketplace, (5) a particular patent law provision
affecting surgery, and (6) the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause.
1. Existing Regulation Perceived as Sufficient
Pressure to regulate surgical procedures is reduced to the extent that
the existing indirect regulatory framework is perceived as adequate to
ensure acceptable surgical outcomes. The public may be generally aware
of the extensive medical training and licensing requirements and the ex-
istence of board certifications, and some may have read informal reviews
that patients themselves place on physician rating websites. The public
may also be aware of high profile medical malpractice cases, and recog-
nize that these suits provide a post-hoc form of oversight by imposing
liability on surgeons whose failure to meet the standard of care results in
patient harm.3 8
However, while existing regulation of surgeons may mitigate the
need for more targeted regulation of the surgeries they perform, it cannot
alone explain the absence of direct regulation. Physicians who prescribe
medications are also subject to the elements of general regulation just
mentioned, yet the pharmaceuticals they prescribe must be separately ap-
proved by the FDA. Given that both medication and surgery represent
38 See generally Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History
and Definitions: The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 109 (2011).
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two broad categories of physician intervention, and that surgery is gener-
ally the more invasive of the two, further explanation is required.
2. Patient and Procedure Heterogeneity
A second explanation for the lack of direct regulation is that varia-
tion in patient condition may indicate a need for one surgical approach
over another. Because patients can present with a spectrum of symptoms
and characteristics, surgical procedures often must be tailored.39 How-
ever, although certain parameters may need to be varied from patient to
patient-for example, the length of an incision or the volume of tissue
resected, 4() this does not foreclose government regulation of the proce-
dure as a whole. By comparison, although pharmaceuticals are approved
in defined doses and formulations, physicians can nevertheless prescribe
"compounded" medicines that are tailored to a patient's particular
needs. 41 Similarly, well-controlled investigations conducted to evaluate a
surgical procedure can, like pharmaceutical trials, utilize study inclusion
and exclusion criteria to ensure uniformity of relevant patient
characteristics. 42
3. Special Challenges in Conducting RCTs
A third explanation for the absence of direct regulation involves
challenges to conducting RCTs, generally considered the "gold standard"
of treatment evaluation,43 for surgical procedures. For example, in con-
trast to the administration of pharmaceuticals, a surgeon's skill in per-
forming (or preference for) a particular procedure or variation may
complicate the randomization process. 4 4 Even when a single surgeon per-
forms the "same" intervention on multiple subjects, the degree of varia-
tion in the precise technique may be greater than the variation from pill
to pill in a pharmaceutical trial, where chemical composition can be
39 Daniel J. Riskin et al., Innovation in Surgery: A Historical Perspective, 244 ANNALS
SURGERY 686, 688 (2006) ("Most surgeons innovate on a daily basis, tailoring therapies and
operations to the intrinsic uniqueness of every patient and their disease.").
40 Sally Frampton & Roger L. Kneebone, John Wickham's New Surgery: 'Minimally
Invasive Therapy', Innovation, and Approaches to Medical Practice in Twentieth-century Brit-
ain, 30 Soc. HIsT. MED. 544, 548 (2016) ("[Ijndividual surgeons often had to vary incision
length depending on the individual factors of each case.").
41 21 U.S.C. § 353A (2017).
42 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(6)(iii)(c) (2016); see also FDA, Guidance for Industry: E9 Statisti-
cal Principles for Clinical Trials, 24 (Sept. 1998), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/
guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm073137.pdf.
43 See Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard-Lessons from the History
of RCTs, 374 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2175, 2175 (2016).
44 See Barnaby C. Reeves, Nonrandomized Studies to Evaluate the Effects of a
Nonpharmacological Intervention, in RANDOMIZED CLINICAL TRIALS OF NONPHARMACOLOGIC
TREATMENTS 143, 146 (Isabelle Boutron et al. eds., 2012).
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specified and dosage can be controlled to within certain tolerances. 45 In
addition, it will usually be impossible to blind the surgeon, and may
often be difficult to blind the patient, leading to a risk of bias.4 6 Although
placebo-controlled or "sham" surgical trials have been conducted, 4 7 their
use raises questions about the ethics of exposing patients to invasive and
potentially risky surgery intended to serve only as a control,4 8 a situation
that contrasts with the use of inert sugar pills in pharmaceutical RCTs.
Finally, it has been suggested that the time required to recruit a sufficient
number of surgical subjects may be longer than it is with pharmaceutical
trials.4 9
These challenges are not insurmountable, however. To the extent
surgeons are not equally proficient with alternate procedures or prefer
one procedure over another, patients can be randomized to surgeons,
rather than to procedures.50 To avoid the ethical uncertainties of sham
surgery, RCTs can compare alternative surgical procedures, or can com-
pare surgical treatment to no treatment or non-surgical treatment. So long
as a state of clinical equipoise exists between the procedures being
tested, randomization is generally considered ethical.5 1 Recruitment
times can be shortened by leveraging large facilities with high patient
volumes, or by coordination among multiple facilities at the national or
international level, as is often done with pharmaceutical trials.
4. Dispersed Industry Structure
While the perceived adequacy of existing regulation combined with
patient and procedure heterogeneity and challenges in conducting RCTs
may begin to explain why surgery has not yet been directly regulated, the
most important explanation may be a matter of industry structure. Unlike
the pharmaceutical industry, where a manufacturer can centrally mass-
produce a drug and sell it on a national or global scale, the surgical mar-
ketplace is composed of numerous small and relatively independent sur-
geons for whom centralized production is impractical and for whom
45 Sally Rudicel & John Esdaile, The Randomized Clinical Trial in Orthopaedics: Obli-
gation or Option?, 67-A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1284, 1288 (1985).
46 See generally Bruce M. Psaty & Ross L. Prentice, Minimizing Bias in Randomized
Trials: The Importance of Blinding, 304 JAMA 793 (2010).
47 See, e.g., M.K. Campbell et al., Developing a Placebo-Controlled Trial in Surgery:
Issues of Design, Acceptability and Feasibility, TRIALS 12:50, 4 (2011).
48 See generally Alex John London & Joseph B. Kadane, Placebos that Harm: Sham
Surgery Controls in Clinical Trials, 11 STAT. METHODS MED. RES. 413 (2002); Ruth Macklin,
The Ethical Problems with Sham Surgery in Clinical Research, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 992
(1999).
49 See Fairbank, supra note 9, at 257.
50 See Michael Baum, Reflections on Randomised Controlled Trials in Surgery, 353
LANCET S16, SI6 (1999); Rudicel & Esdaile, supra note 45, at 1292.
51 Patrick J. McDonald et al., Ethical Issues in Surgical Research, 53 CAN. J. SURGERY
133, 134 (2010).
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declining marginal costs are less important. The industry therefore suf-
fers from a type of collective action problem: while surgical practice as a
whole might benefit from comparative studies of safety and efficacy, in-
dividual surgeons have no means of recouping investment costs via cen-
tralized sale, and there is not yet a simple, low-cost means for
coordinating research activities among dispersed surgeons or medical
facilities.
5. Patent Law
A special statutory provision that prohibits enforcement of surgical
patents further complicates the recovery of investment costs. Patents pro-
tect drugs for twenty years from the date of patent filing (which often
occurs several years before FDA approval), providing pharmaceutical
companies the exclusive right to sell their product for a limited period of
time.52 The right to exclude others from selling competing products en-
ables the patent holder to charge higher prices during the exclusivity pe-
riod. Patents may be obtained to cover almost any type of subject matter,
including not only products but also processes, such as methods of treat-
ing a disease or manufacturing a pharmaceutical ingredient.53
Patents on surgical methods, however, were substantially limited by
statute in the 1990s following the high-profile dispute of Pallin v.
Singer.54 In that case, Arizona ophthalmic surgeon55 Dr. Samuel Pallin
obtained a patent on a method of performing cataract surgery that did not
require stitches, thereby avoiding suture-induced astigmatism. 56 He re-
portedly envisioned a modest $5 royalty on the $1000 procedure, which
was less than the $17 cost of sutures,5 7 but opponents observed that sur-
gical patents nevertheless increase costs, limit the ability to conduct fur-
ther academic research, and could cause some physicians to rationalize
the use of an inferior procedure rather than pay a licensing fee, among
other concerns.58 Following a patent infringement suit by Dr. Pallin
against Dr. Singer and the medical center where Singer worked, the
American Medical Association and other physician groups successfully
lobbied Congress to prohibit such patents. 59 In 1996, a provision was
52 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017).
53 Id. § 101 (2017).
54 Pallin v. Singer, No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
55 Sabra Chartrand, Why Is this Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1995), http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/06/08/business/why-is-this-surgeon-suing.html.
56 U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14, 1992).
57 See Chartrand, supra note 55.
58 Patenting of Medical Procedures, House of Delegates Proceedings, 144th Annual
Meeting, June 18-22, 1995, Reports of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 200-06, http//
ama.nmtvault.conjsp/browse.jsp.
59 Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)-The Physician Immunity Statute, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 701, 702-04 (1997).
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enacted that, while not barring surgical patents per se, prohibits their en-
forcement against the surgeon or the hospital in which the surgery is
performed 60 (device manufacturers or others who induce infringement by
physicians might still be liable 61 ). By substantially reducing the ability of
patent holders to monetize surgical patents, the 1996 law makes it more
difficult to recoup investment costs needed to rigorously study those pro-
cedures, thereby contributing to the collective action problem mentioned
above.
To address the challenges posed by industry structure and patent
law, a publicly-funded organization such as the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) could conduct or fund studies. Alternately, Congress could
create financial incentives for private entities to study surgical proce-
dures, as it has done to promote the study and development of drugs for
rare diseases, a therapeutic category for which profitability and patient
recruitment can be similarly problematic. 62 The government might also
coordinate or facilitate the private coordination of "platform trials" to
lower the transaction costs of bringing together surgical researchers who
are addressing similar conditions with different approaches. Platform tri-
als contain a single master protocol across experimental treatment arms,
such that each arm shares a common statistical analysis plan and
predefined efficacy criteria.6 3 Similarly, the federal government could
promote the creation of data-sharing platforms that would allow surgeons
and patients to voluntarily contribute data in a standardized format that
could then be aggregated and analyzed. The Precision Medicine Initia-
tive, launched by President Obama in 2015, reflects this latter approach
by encouraging private healthcare entities to use open, standardized ap-
plication program interfaces that allow individual patients to contribute
their data to research.6 4
6. No Interstate Commerce
Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government has broad
power to regulate interstate commerce, while regulation of intrastate
commerce is entrusted to the states. 6 5 Although it is not always clear
60 Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67 (1996)
(creating 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)).
61 See Elizabeth Moulton, Note, Inducing Immune Infringement: The Interplay of Section
287(c) and Section 271(b), 13 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. Rev. 206, 225-27 (2012).
62 H.R. Rep. 97-840(I), at 12 (1982).
63 Benjamin R. Saville & Scott M. Berry, Efficiencies of Platform Clinical Trials: A
Vision for the Future, 13 CLINICAL TRIALS 358, 364 (2016).
64 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PREss SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: OBAMA ADMINIS-
TRATION ANNOUNCES KEY ACTIONS To ACCELERATE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE (Feb. 25,
2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-obama-administra
tion-announces-key-actions-accelerate.
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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which business activities constitute interstate versus intrastate commerce,
the practice of medicine has traditionally not been considered interstate
commerce, 66 limiting the power of the federal government to regulate
medicine, including surgery. The creation of an FDA analogue to regu-
late surgery, or an attempt to grant surgery regulation powers to the FDA
itself, would therefore face legal uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not serve as a complete bar to
regulation. Regulation may originate in state legislatures, so long as it is
carried out in a manner that does not impose an undue burden on inter-
state commerce.67 In addition, the federal government can regulate surgi-
cal research where that research is federally funded or conducted by a
federal agency, as it has done by promulgating the Common Rule for the
protection of clinical trial subjects.68 Finally, the Constitution does not
limit the federal government's ability to conduct or fund research
through agencies such as the NIH.
B. Understanding Current Deficiencies
Surgeons ideally recommend surgical procedures based on evidence
of the safety and effectiveness of the available options, in light of a pa-
tient's particular circumstances. Unfortunately, available evidence may
be sparse or inadequate, in part because there is no regulatory framework
that systematically requires evidence to support the use of a particular
procedure. As a result, reports of surgical procedures and outcomes may
be generated, if at all, according to the varying interests and uncoordi-
nated efforts of disparate surgeons or researchers.
The surgical literature may therefore be deficient simply by its ab-
sence. When studies are available, it may be difficult to make appropriate
treatment decisions, for example, because the various reports do not de-
scribe surgical indications precisely or consistently. Important details of
surgical procedures may not be reported or the number of patients may
be too small to draw reliable conclusions. Researchers attempting to un-
dertake meta-analyses may be frustrated by inconsistent protocols, such
as where patient outcomes are measured at different times or using dif-
ferent scales, or where patient demographics vary widely between stud-
ies. Such study design and reporting attributes can produce data that are
difficult to interpret or compare, leaving the surgeon with a confusing
and inconclusive body of literature.
66 Slocum v. City of Fredonia, 8 P.2d 332, 334 (Kan. 1932); see generally Lainie R.
Rutkow & Jon S. Vernick, The U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court, and
Public Health, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 750 (2011).
67 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996).
68 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2016).
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The literature addressing surgical correction of Haglund's deform-
ity, a protrusion of bone on the back of the heel, provides an example of
potential shortcomings. Although journal articles addressing Haglund's
deformity date at least as far back as 1928,69 the nearly nine decades
since have produced mostly low-quality evidence such as case reports or
suggested surgical techniques and lack data that can be systematically
evaluated. In 2012, Wiegerinck et al. published results of a systematic
review of the Haglund's deformity literature, with the goal of
"provid[ing] a clear overview of the best available surgical treatment mo-
dality for chronic RB [retrocalcaneal bursitis]." 7 0 Although their litera-
ture search terms produced 876 unique articles, only fifteen (1.7%)
retrievable articles reported relevant data for at least ten patients and in-
cluded as study outcomes either a pain scale, American Orthopaedic Foot
& Ankle Society score, or patient satisfaction.7' None was prospective,
randomized, and controlled, and Wiegerinck et al. classified all fifteen
studies as either of "low" or "very low" quality on the Downs and
Black 7 2 quality assessment scale, with a weighted mean score for the
fifteen studies of 13.3 points out of a possible 32 points.7 3
Variation in study design further frustrated comparison and analy-
sis. Follow up times within the fifteen studies ranged from three months
to 240 months. 7 4 Average patient age among the studies ranged from
twenty to fifty-seven years.7 5 The non-weight bearing period following
surgery ranged from zero (i.e., immediate weight bearing) to eight
weeks. 7 6 Different outcome questionnaires were used and outcome mea-
sures were heterogeneous, making the classification of outcomes across
studies into "excellent," "good," "fair," and "poor" difficult to inter-
pret.77 Three studies reported an endoscopic surgical technique while
twelve used an open technique .7 Within those twelve studies, fourteen
different surgical approaches were evaluated (some studies reported the
results of more than one approach).7 9 Variables potentially related to pa-
tient outcome were not systematically varied, explained, or even re-
69 Patrik Haglund, Beitrag Zur Klinik der Achillessehne [Article for the Achilles' Heel
Clinic], 49 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ORTHOPAEDISCHE CHIRURGIE 49 (1928) (Get.).
70 Johannes I. Wiegerinck et al., Surgical Treatment of Chronic Retrocalcaneal Bursitis,
28 J. ARTHROSCOPY & RELATED SURGERY 283, 283 (2012).
71 Id. at 284.
72 Sarah H. Downs & Nick Black, The Feasibility of Creating a Checklist for the Assess-
ment of the Methodological Quality Both of Randomised and Non-Randonised Studies of
Health Care Interventions, 52 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 377 (1998).
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ported.80 For example, because only one study reported whether the
retrocalcaneal bursa was removed, researchers were left with little evi-
dence as to the impact of bursa excision on patient outcome.81
C. Improving Evidence Through Increased Surgical Regulation
The federal government could act to address current deficiencies in
the surgical literature, such as by identifying evidence gaps and generat-
ing data to fill those gaps. As a second-best alternative, regulation could
maximize the value of information currently generated by existing pa-
tient populations by promoting or requiring federal adverse event report-
ing, standardizing terminology, and facilitating analysis of existing
health record databases.
1. Identifying Gaps, Data Generation
Congress could task a government body, such as the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), with identifying gaps in the
available literature and generating evidence where needed. The AHRQ is
already statutorily empowered to conduct research that develops and
presents scientific evidence regarding the outcomes and effectiveness of
health care practices, including surgery. 82 The agency could be specifi-
cally directed, for example, to identify the most common or important
medical conditions for which surgery is potentially indicated as well as
the surgical and non-surgical treatments for these conditions, and to syn-
thesize the available evidence with respect to the outcomes associated
with these treatments. Where efforts by the AHRQ show the evidence to
be insufficient, the AHRQ or another government agency could be di-
rected to undertake or fund studies to produce relevant data.
Studies already undertaken by the AHRQ confirm the need for such
data generation. In a systematic review commissioned by the AHRQ ad-
dressing surgical and non-surgical treatment of rotator cuff tears, the re-
view found it was not possible to reach firm conclusions as to the value
of the various treatment options due to such factors as sparse data, low
study quality, incomplete follow-up, the absence of control groups, high
risks of bias, and other problems.83 In particular, the review noted a pau-
city of evidence with respect to the key variable of early versus delayed
surgery, an important consideration for healthcare providers when advis-
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 299, 299b-5(a)(3) (2016).
83 See MARY BUTLER ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, PUD.
No. 13-EHCO50-EF, NONOPERATIVE AND OPERATIVE TREATMENTS FOR ROTATOR CUFF
TEARS: FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS (Feb. 2013), https://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/prod
ucts/505/1394/rotator-cuff-tears-future-i 30627.pdf.
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ing patients whether to pursue non-operative options before turning to
surgery.8 4 Despite recognition of the lack of evidence, a follow-up report
four years after the initial review found very few studies had subse-
quently been published.85
2. Improving Data Capture Through Adverse Event Reporting
A relatively simple measure to capture high-level adverse event data
associated with surgical procedures is to require surgeons or hospitals to
report adverse event data to a government body tasked with monitoring
such data. Models for facilitating similar data capture already exist in the
context of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, where the Federal Ad-
verse Event Reporting System86 (pharmaceuticals) and Manufacturer and
User Facility Device Experience8 7 (devices) allow physicians, and re-
quire manufacturers, to report serious adverse events to the FDA. A simi-
lar system could be implemented in the surgical context. Although some
states already require reporting of adverse events following surgery,88
state-level efforts are generally focused on capturing and preventing ad-
verse events that result from serious errors, such as performing surgery
on the wrong part of the body or on the wrong patient, rather than on
determining whether one surgical option results in better outcomes or
more serious or more frequent adverse events than another, even when
each is properly performed. 89 Moreover, each state captures only a por-
tion of the surgical adverse event data generated nationwide each year,
making it difficult to evaluate less common surgical interventions.
3. Improving Data Quality Through Standardization
To the extent that government funded research and data capture are
infeasible or inadequate, the federal government could take steps to en-
hance the utility of data generated by researchers who are already active
in conducting studies. Standardized terms could be encouraged for medi-
84 Id. at ES-1.
85 Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Comparative Effectiveness of Non-Opera-
tive and Operative Treatments for Rotator Cuff Tears 3 (Mar. 20, 2014), https://effectivehealth
care.ahrq.gov/ehc/assets/File/rotator-cuff-tear-nomination- 140925.pdf.
86 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON FDA's ADVERSE EVENT
REPORTING SYSTEM, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm2007060.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
87 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUFACTURER AND USER FACILITY DEVICE EXPERI-
ENCE DATABASE, https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Post
marketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/ucml27891.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2017);
Medical Device Reporting, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/ReportaProb
lem/#voluntary (last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
88 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-d(4) (McKinney 2016).
89 See DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPEC-
TOR GENERAL, ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: STATE REPORTING SYSTEMS, Dec. 2008, at 22.
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cal conditions, procedures, devices, and techniques to reduce confusion
and increase cross-study comparability. 90 For example, where multiple
terms are used to describe a single medical condition (e.g., "myocardial
infarction," "heart attack"), meta-analyses of the existing literature may
fail to capture all relevant data where less common terms are used (e.g.,
"cardiac infarction").9 ' Similarly, where different reports use imprecise
terms or terms for which meaning has changed over time, it may be diffi-
cult to determine whether outcomes are comparable, or whether they can
be appropriately combined into pooled analyses.
The clear benefit of a consistent vocabulary combined with the gen-
eral absence of federal regulation has left a gap that others have already
begun to fill. In 2007, nine charter countries 92 established the Interna-
tional Health Terminology Standards Development Organisation (IHT-
SDO) to promote the consistent use of clinical terminology. 93 In the
United States, the National Library of Medicine (NLM), a part of the
NIH 9 4 and also the U.S. representative to IHTSDO, serves as the national
coordinating body for clinical terminology standards such as the IHT-
SDO's Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED) and the
World Health Organization's (WHO) International Statistical Classifica-
tion of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). 95
Despite the efforts of NLM, IHTSDO, WHO and others at achiev-
ing a uniform lexicon, concern over inadequate standardization of termi-
nology remains. 96 Regulations could disseminate standardized
terminology more effectively, or require aspiring researchers to acknowl-
edge their intent to follow identified standards (such as those of IHT-
SDO) as a condition of receiving federal funding.
More ambitious regulation might extend standardization to test vari-
ables, study protocols, and outcome measures via recommended guide-
90 See generally James J. Cimino, Desiderata for Controlled Medical Vocabularies in
the Twenty-First Century, 37 METHODS INFO. MED. 394 (1998).
91 See Russell Buchanan & Marc Koehn, Building the Business Case for SNOMED CT,
INT'L HEALTH TERMINOLOGY STANDARDS DEV. ORG., 2014, at 17.
92 Member Countries, SNOMED INT'L, http://www.snomed.org/about/member-countries
(last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
93 Objectives and Results, SNOMED INT'L, http://www.ihtsdo.org/about-ihtsdo/objec-
tives-and-results (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
94 NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, LIST OF NIH INsTrruTES, CENTERS, & OFFICES, https://
www.nih.gov/institutes-nih/list-nih-institutes-centers-offices (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
95 NLM Health Data Standards Executive Summary for 2015, NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED.,
Jan. 15,2016, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/healthit/executive-summaries/2015/index.html; United
States, SNOMED.ORG, http://www.ihtsdo.org/member/United-states (last visited Feb. 28,
2017).
96 See, e.g., Eivind Berge, Can We Agree on a Standard Terminology for Catheter-Based
Interventions for Acute Ischemic Stroke?, 45 STROKE e42, e42 (2014); Philip J. Kroth et al.,
Using LOINC to Link Ten Terminology Standards to One Unified Standard in a Specialized
Domain, 45 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATIcs 674 (2012).
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lines. For example, for each condition routinely addressed by surgery, a
government regulator might establish suggested test variables to be re-
ported (e.g., patient age, duration of symptoms), study protocols (e.g.,
time until follow-up), and outcome measures (e.g., Numerical Rating
Scale for pain). Based in the United Kingdom, the publicly-funded
COMET Initiative has already made efforts to achieve such standardiza-
tion through the development of "core outcome sets" that represent the
minimum outcomes that should be measured and reported in all clinical
trials.97
4. Big Data Analytics
The 64 million surgical procedures performed each year generate a
tremendous volume of data that could serve to illuminate safety and effi-
cacy, given a means of capturing and analyzing it. Congress has already
recognized the value of incorporating patient feedback, as reflected in its
recent enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act, which requires the FDA
to consider the use of "patient experience data" in regulatory decision-
making. 98 Congress has also directed the FDA to establish a post-market
risk identification system, known as Sentinel, based on the analysis of
patient records, including health insurance claims records.99 The Sentinel
initiative has resulted in the creation of an infrastructure for systemati-
cally mining databases of hospitals and insurance companies for infor-
mation that can help to identify drug risks.'" Although not without
limitations, such as incomplete reporting and data quality problems, the
Sentinel initiative could provide lessons on how best to mine large data
sets to generate patient-relevant safety and efficacy data associated with
surgical procedures.
CONCLUSION
Systematic evaluation of both existing and innovative surgical pro-
cedures is needed to make important safety and efficacy data available to
surgeons, facilitating optimal treatment decisions. High quality risk-ben-
efit data is also essential if the healthcare system is to honor its obliga-
tion to inform patients of relevant benefits and risks prior to obtaining
their consent to treatment.
97 Overview, COMET INITIATIVE, http://www.comet-initiative.org/aboutloverview (last
visited Aug. 4, 2017).
98 Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001-3004, 130 Stat. 1033, 1083-86 (2016) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c).
99 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 944 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B) (2016)).
100 Jonathan J. Darrow, Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 805, 839-42
(2014).
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Yet for a variety of reasons, surgical procedures are not subject to
direct regulation. As a result, surgeons consulting the available literature
may find it inadequate to answer fundamental questions about optimal
treatment choices. This failure of information increases the chance that,
for years or even generations, patients will undergo painful or risky sur-
geries until further study eventually exposes them as either inferior to
alternatives, or worse, as causing more harm than good. Unfortunately,
history has repeatedly borne witness to such medical embarrassments,
from the centuries-old practice of bloodletting to the disconcertingly re-
cent examples of radical mastectomies and autologous bone marrow
transplants, among many others. 01
The federal government is well-positioned to support needed surgi-
cal research activities at the national level, both through the identification
of evidence gaps and the funding of studies to fill those gaps. The gov-
ernment is also well-positioned to coordinate the private surgical re-
search marketplace through activities such as the aggregation of country-
level adverse event data and the setting of standards for medical termi-
nology and guidelines for study protocols. In partnership with state gov-
ernments and private organizations, the federal government can
contribute to appropriate regulation that improves evidence development
without imposing disproportionate burdens on surgeons or others.
101 RICHARD A. RETTIG ET AL., FALSE HOPE: BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR
BREAST CANCER (2007); J. Bruce Moseley et al., A Controlled Trial of Arthroscopic Surgery
for Osteoarthritis of the Knee, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 81 (2002); Joel Braslow, Therapeutic
Effectiveness and Social Context: The Case of Lobotomy in a California State Hospital,
1947-1954, 170 W.J. MED. 293 (1999); HJM Barnett et al., Failure of Extracranial-In-
tracranial Arterial Bypass to Reduce the Risk of Ischemic Stroke: Results of an International
Randomized Trial, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1191 (1985); J.L. Turk & Elizabeth Allen, Bleeding
and Cupping, 65 ANN. ROYAL C. SURGEONS ENG. 128 (1983); Umberto Veronesi et al., Com-
paring Radical Mastectomy with Quadrantectomy, Axillary Dissection, and Radiotherapy in
Patients with Small Cancers of the Breast, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 6 (1981); Leonard A. Cobb
et al., An Evaluation of Internal-Mammary-Artery Ligation by a Double-Blind Technic, 260
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1115 (1959).
